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This paper overviews the economic history of the period between 1853, the year 
when Commodore Perry’s ‘black ships’ arrived at Shimoda, and 1885, the year 
that marked the end of the so-called Matsukata recession period. The chapter 
will trace economic, political and regime changes during this transitional period 
in the first four sections. After having explored the question of continuity and 
discontinuity, I will have a critical look at what the oft-quoted slogan of the new 
Meiji government, ‘rich nation, strong army’, meant. The penultimate section 
discusses the issue of whether or not early Meiji Japan was a developmental, 
plan-rational state by taking a close look at actual policy changes in the 1870s 
and 80s. The last section draws implications for the changing constellations in 
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1. 1853: Japan under pressure 
 
The prelude to the Meiji Restoration was the forced opening of ports to international trade 
in 1859, which was in fact an end-product of the cumulative effects of a foreign threat 
experienced  from  the  late  eighteenth  century.  The  century-long  seclusion  policy  was 
under pressure for much of the latter half of the Tokugawa rule. In 1793 an order to fire 
on foreign vessels was issued for the first time, and the Morrison incident in 1837 was the 
precursor to the regular appearance off the Japanese coast of Western vessels, and finally 
of Commodore Perry’s ‘black ships’ in 1853.   
  All  this  forced  government  officials  at  various  levels  to  busy  themselves 
working  out  plans  to  counter  the  threat.  None  of  the  measures  actually  taken  was 
satisfactory, however. Nor were they cost free. The deployment of cannon on the coast, 
for example, was not easy, given Tokugawa technological standards, and was expensive 
to  both  central  and  domainal  government  administrations.  When  Commodore  Perry’s 
squadron of four ships arrived in Uraga, at the southern end of Edo Bay, it was equipped 
with high-powered shell guns. Confronting them were 99 cannon on a fort constructed off 
the shore by the shogunal government. A majority of the 99, however, were much shorter 
                                                 
 This chapter is essentially an amalgam of Shunsaku Nishikawa and Osamu Saito’s paper 
of a similar title (Nishikawa and Saito 1985) with Mataji Umemura and Yuzo 
Yamamoto’s introduction to Volume 3 of the Iwanami series (Umemura and Yamamoto 
1989b). However, a good deal of the selection, addition and revision was made on the 
basis of works published after 1985, including the political historian Junji Banno’s 
chapter in the above Iwanami volume (Banno 1989). Louis Cullen, Penny Franck and 
Yasukichi Yasuba offered valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the 
manuscript, for which I am most grateful. 2 
 
mortar guns. This fort was one of 600 that had been built along the country’s coastline 
since the turn of the century. The earlier ones were mere earthen mounds with wooden 
cannon. But those constructed by the shogunate and by powerful domains such as Choshu, 
Mito, Saga and Satsuma must have been somewhat upgraded ones.  These domains as 
well as the shogunate also set up military schools to train troops, inviting teachers who 
were  familiar  with  Western  weaponry,  which  in  turn  led  to  the  establishment  of  iron 
production and Western-style shipbuilding. The first Western-style sailing boat planned 
by the shogunal government was built at Uraga in 1854 and the first Japanese steamship, 
a paddle steamer built in the Netherlands, was launched at Nagasaki in 1855; the same 
year, a naval training programme was set up under Dutch instructors; and an even more 
ambitious plan to built a shipyard at Yokosuka was put into action. On the damain side, 
Satsuma was first to build a Western-style ship, and Mito and Saga followed. All this, 
however,  meant  an  ever-growing  financial  burden  on  the  shogunate  as  well  as  on 
domainal governments (Beasley 1989: 261-71; Cullen 2003: chs.5-6). 
  The impact of rearmament on the treasuries of the shogunate and the domains 
was unprecedented. First, apart from the obvious consequence of increasing deficits, the 
weakness of Tokugawa Japan’s whole revenue system was exposed. A cursory look at 
other early modern states in Eurasia reveals that the Tokugawa system relied far more 
heavily on direct taxation in the form of rice tax, leaving little room for indirect taxation. 
It is true that within the closed realm interregional trade had developed considerably, and 
that domainal governments  were showing increasing interest in trade and industry; as 
explored  in  volume  1  of  this  series  (Nishikawa  and  Amano  2004),  some  established 
domainal  ‘monopsonies’  in  order  to  seize  opportunities  arising  in  the  expanding 
countrywide market nexus. However, no excise duties were levied by the shogunate. Nor 
was any  attempt made by the domainal governments  to levy tariffs on incoming and 
outgoing  commodities.  As  a  consequence,  according  to  an  invaluable  estimate  of  the 
input-output table made for Choshu’s economy in the 1840s, as much as 97 per cent of 
the  domainal  government’s  revenue  came  from  the  agricultural  sector.  Despite  its 
flourishing proto-industries such as cotton textiles, wax making and salt manufacturing, 
only 3 per cent of the revenue accrued from these and other non-agricultural pursuits 
(Nishikawa 1987: 325).   
  Second, the need to find non-conventional sources of additional income became 
pressing.  Sporadic  attempts  were  made  to  squeeze  money  out  of  wealthy  merchants’ 
coffers by both central and local authorities. On the shogunate side, there was a tendency 
to shift some of the defence burdens onto daimyo administrations, successfully at least 
until  1853,  which  thus  prevented  the  shogunate’s  fiscal  position  from  worsening. 
However, more effective was currency debasement. Successive debasements since 1818 
provided a huge amount of extra income to the treasury while triggering modest to high, 3 
 
if not hyper, rates of price increase. In the local domainal economy, as we will see a little 
more closely in section 5 below, this option of increasing the money supply in the form of 
paper money had long been pursued. The lesson learnt eventually by the domains was, 
not surprisingly, that an adequate currency reserve had to be maintained if the value of 
notes issued was to be kept at an acceptable level. Moreover, some daimyo authorities 
came to realise that, if increases in the money  supply were coupled with a policy of 
promoting domestic industry and commerce, they were less likely to result in financial 
chaos. Partly because time was too short for the shogunal officials to absorb these lessons, 
but also because the issue of legal tender was monopolised by the shogunate, habitual 
resort  was  made  to  debasement.  It  is  no  surprise,  therefore,  that  the  huge  cost  of 
rearmament after 1853 was financed largely by profits from the Man’en debasement of 
1860 (Yamamoto in this volume). 
  Third, Western studies gained weight. Since the early eighteenth century Dutch 
learning had already, though gradually, been taking root in Tokugawa intellectual circles. 
But it was medical science and, to a lesser extent, astronomy that Dutch learning actually 
meant. The necessity to learn more about Western weaponry and  warships turned the 
authorities’  attention  from  tradition  Confucian  learning  to  more  practical,  technical 
studies,  which  eventually  led  some  of  intellectuals  to  the  realisation  that  behind  the 
West’s military superiority lay industrialisation. Having learned the Dutch language and 
Western military science, they were convinced that Western-style shipbuilding and arms 
industries should be transplanted from the West. As men brought up in the neo-Confucian 
tradition, most of the samurai held a  traditional view of polity and society. But their 
stance led many to realise the importance of Western technology and its material base.   
  Fourth, the process of contacts and negotiations with foreign countries gave rise 
to a kind of nationalism. This was not so much of ultranationalist or nativist doctrines, but 
of a newly emerging orientation towards ‘one nation’. Over the centuries since ancient 
times, Japanese discussions of state governance had been confined within the classical 
Chinese  framework  of  ‘feudal’  (hōken)  vs  ‘central’  (gunken,  literally  a  hierarchy  of 
administrative districts and prefectures). The Tokugawa system was regarded as one kind 
of hōken rule. Confronted with Western superpowers, this Tokugawa hōken system came 
to be seriously questioned. It was argued that the lack of a unified sovereign state lay 
behind all the domestic confusion in the negotiation process of the treaties with the West. 
Thus, the polity (kōgi) came up as a central agenda in the discussions of diplomatic issues 
(Mitani 2006: 113). Even daimyos who were not in the inner circle of the shogunate 
government now openly discussed thorny diplomatic issues in relation to the kōgi. For 
example,  a  reformist  group  of  daimyos,  led  by  Matsudaira  Shungaku  of  Fukui,  a 
Tokugawa related house, but including eminent ‘outside’ daimyos as well, talked about a 
reform of the existing kōgi. The need for a unified nation grew.   4 
 
  All this paved the way to the consensus that ‘fukoku kyōhei’ (rich nation, strong 
army) should be achieved under government leadership. At this stage, the ‘government’ 
meant each daimyo government as the abolition of daimyo domains was never in sight. 
However, we will see the new Meiji unified nation launching development programmes 
under the same slogan. 
 
2. The entry into world trade 
 
One  immediate  economic  consequence  of  the  opening  of  the  country  in  1859  was  a 
substantial  outflow  of  gold  coins.  The  commercial  treaties  with  the  West  included  a 
clause setting exchange rates between Japanese and foreign currencies on the basis  of 
weight for weight. The standard currency circulating in that period had an intrinsic value 
different from its face value, while for the Mexican dollar, widely used in the Far East, 
both  were  virtually  equal.  Since  the  gold-to-silver  ratio  was  about  1  to  5  within  the 
country as against 1 to 15 outside Japan, the Mexican dollar was exchanged for Japanese 
gold coins by Western merchants, who could pocket large profits by selling the gold at the 
world ratio abroad. This inevitably led to a ‘gold rush’ in the treaty ports.   
  In  order  to  counter  this  crisis,  the  shogunate  re-minted  old  coins  to  bring 
Japanese  coinage  into  line  with  international  gold-to-silver  ratios.  It  was  this  1860 
debasement which enabled the government to stop the outflow of gold coins, on the one 
hand, and, as noted above, to finance further programmes of rearmament, on the other.
1 
The cost to the Japanese was inflation. In the traditionally gold -using regions the price 
rise was five-fold from the time of  the opening of the  ports to the ye ar 1869, but if 
measured in silver, the increase was as high as ten-fold (see Figure 1).   
  Undoubtedly the price hike fuelled  the social and political troubles of the day. 
The number of peasant uprisings and urban riots involving property destruction increased 
during the 1860s, at least in part as a result of such disruptive price rises. However, there 
                                                 
1  By the time the treaties with the West were concluded, silver currency by weight had 
ceased to circulate. Instead, it was coins made of silver but denominated in a gold unit 
that were in circulation. Of these silver coins, the ichibu-gin was the most widely used. 
This is why the ichibu-gin was targeted for the exchange with the Mexican dollar on the 
basis of weight for weight. The initial measure taken by the Tokugawa government was, 
rightly, to devalue silver against gold. In 1859 the shogunate issued a new silver coin 
(called the Ansei nishu-gin). However, this move was blocked by the foreign 
representatives. In February 1860, the shogunate had to announce the re-minting of the 
existing gold coins, bringing Japanese coinage into line with world gold-to-silver ratios. 
This February 1860 measure did check the export of gold, with no profit to the shogunate 
treasury. It was the large-scale debasement of those gold coins undertaken four months 
later that fuelled inflation and brought about a huge profit to the government (Ohkura and 
Shimbo 1978: 111-7; Yamamoto in this volume). 5 
 
was another aspect to this ‘price revolution’. Once the intrinsic values of the Japanese 
currencies  were  adjusted to world ratios,  the entry into international trade meant  that 
domestic prices, which had been insulated from world market trends for so long, had to 
be adjusted to world price levels. The decade of inflation in Japan reflected that process 
of price adjustment. For commodities confronting an influx of imports, a price rise meant 
the  weakening  of  their  competitive  power  in  the  market.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan’s 
exportable  goods  sold  at  attractive  prices  overseas.  Given  the  magnitude  of  the  price 
change, the impact, be it positive or negative, on industry and commerce must have been 
profound (Ohkura and Shimbo 1978). The differential impact of this price change can 
best be inferred from the movement in the export price series relative to the price series 
for commodities competing with imports. As shown in Figure 2, the level of the relative 
price index in the 1860s and later was about 30 per cent higher than the level in the 1830s 
through the early 1850s. The swiftness of the shift is worth noting.   
  The balance of payments was not particularly adversely affected for the first 
years after the opening of the treaty ports. However, as foreign trade grew, the country 
suffered a persistent import surplus until World War I (Sugiyama in this volume). The 
import-related price series used for Figure 2 is a weighted average of prices for ginned 
cotton, cotton yarn, cotton textiles, seed oil and sugar. A glance at earlier trade statistics 
shows that imports of cotton yarn and of cotton and woollen goods were three-fifths of 
the total, while other major imports were sugar and weaponry. Much of the competitive 
pressure from imports, therefore, is reflected in this series. Among imports, cotton goods 
were most disruptive in their impact. On the other hand, the export series consists only of 
raw silk and silk fabrics. Although silk cloth did not appear on the list of exports in the 
early statistics, raw silk and silkworm eggs accounted for about three-fourths of total 
exports. Raw silk remained by far the most important export for the entire Meiji period. It 
should  be  remembered  that  silk  had  been  imported from  China  before  the  Tokugawa 
shogunate  closed  the  country.  Silk  was  a  product  of  Tokugawa  Japan’s  century-long 
process of substitution of domestic products for imports. Had this import-substitution not 
taken place under the ‘seclusion’ regime, Meiji Japan’s trade deficits would have been 
prohibitively  large.  Besides  silk  and  silk-related  goods,  tea,  rice  and  coal  occupied  a 
non-negligible place in the export statistics. Of the three, tea reduced its share over time 
while rice and coal increased their share, at least until the end of the century. 
  Three additional points can be made in relation to the nature of the commercial 
treaties concluded with the West. The first is that laissez faire was imposed by the treaties. 
Import duties were fixed at the low rate of 5 per cent ad valorem for most commodities 
coming  into  Japan,  such  as  textiles,  steam  engines  and  minerals.  Just  as  Tokugawa 
daimyo  governments  had  been  unable  to  raise  revenue  through  levying  ‘tariffs’  on 
incoming goods, the Meiji government was ‘robbed’ of a means to increase revenue and, 6 
 
more importantly, to take control of its macro economy. Second, judicial autonomy was 
also ‘stolen’. Western traders in foreign settlements in the treaty ports had the benefits of 
extraterritoriality. All these arrangements, modelled on the Chinese treaty port system, 
were thus referred to as ‘unequal treaties’ and a revision of the treaties with the Western 
nations became an obsession of later governments. Present-day scholars too tend to think 
that the treaty port system worked only in favour of the Western countries. However, 
Shinya  Sugiyama  questions  this  conventional  view,  suggesting  that  it  ‘acted  as  a 
non-tariff barrier to economic penetration by the industrialized West and protected the 
domestic  market  from  Western  manipulation’  (Sugiyama  1988:  75.  For  details,  see 
Sugiyama in this volume). Whether or not distribution was under  the total control of 
Japanese merchants is debatable. Whichever the interpretation, however, it is certain that 
the system discouraged foreign direct investment in Japanese distribution and industry 
and that the domestic market remained largely unscathed by Western commercial interests. 
Third,  the  fact  that  Japan  entered  world  trade  under  the  Western  impact  does  not 
necessarily imply that Japanese traders’ chief competitors were Western merchants. It is 
true that Lancashire-made cotton goods such as grey shirtings occupied a central place in 
Japan’s imports, but a substantial portion of such cotton imports were actually re-exports 
from Shanghai in the hands of Chinese merchants. Later, moreover, Indian-made cotton 
yarn became the major competitor of Japan’s cotton industry in the Asian market. Much 
of the impact of the entry into world trade, therefore, took the form of competition with 
Asian merchants and producers (see for example Furuta 2005). 
 
3. The economy 1859-1885 
 
As noted above, the restoration period was a time of inflation. But at the same time, it 
was a period of growth. The domestic economy grew in real terms despite the very sharp 
price  increase.  This  owed  much  to  export-led  increases  of  production  in  rural  areas, 
especially silk-producing and, to a lesser extent, tea-growing areas. In fact,  these two 
commodities made up well over 50 per cent of the total exports even after the 1860s. This 
inflationary  growth  did  not  go  on  uninterrupted.  It  was  terminated  by  the  so-called 
Matsukata deflation, an austerity policy taken by the then finance minister Matsukata 
Masayoshi and the resulting fall in prices in the early 1880s. Until then, however, the 
period saw the macro economy growing, if not in a sustained manner. 
  When did this growth start? Did it begin after the treaty ports were opened, or 
some time before 1859? According to recent scholarship, the  growth of the domestic 
economy seems to have started in the 1820s and 30s, well before the country entered 
world trade. One piece of evidence comes from price history. Having estimated price 
series for Osaka and Kyoto, Hiroshi Shimbo found an unmistakable increase in the price 7 
 
level from the 1820s and argued that the country had entered a phase with a long-term 
price rise which carried on into the Meiji era (Shimbo 1978; Shimbo and Saito 2004). The 
price rise was occasioned by the Tokugawa government’s 1818-20 debasement. The point 
of his argument is that the increased money supply must have had an impact similar to 
that of Keynesian fiscal policy, because much of the enormous increment of money newly 
minted  took  place  by  means  of  increases  in  both  the  household  and  government 
expenditure of the shogunate.   
  Although  Shimbo  gave  no  direct  evidence  concerning  whether  or  not  the 
economy actually grew after the 1820s, this issue was taken up by Mataji Umemura. His 
argument is that the inflation process enabled entrepreneurs to make a profit because the 
movement of money wages was more or less stationary until the 1850s. What was taking 
place was therefore profit inflation and Umemura provides some evidence that the profits 
thus accumulated were used for capital formation. First, there are clear indications that 
agricultural investments increased from the late Tokugawa period. The number of civil 
engineering works in embankments, irrigation and other forms of river improvement rose 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, all of which increased either the arable area or 
the quality of existing farmland. Most of these public works, moreover, took place in the 
underdeveloped, eastern regions of the country (Umemura 1981). 
  A second piece of evidence is concerned with shipping along the Japan Sea 
coast.  Umemura  finds  that  the  number  of  arrivals  at  two  ports,  for  which  data  are 
available, increased in the same period, and that the distribution of ships entering these 
ports changed. In the eighteenth century a majority of the owners of these ships came 
from in the core regions, i.e. the Inland Sea and Osaka areas, while in the nineteenth the 
proportion of those from the Japan Sea areas rose substantially. This is interpreted as 
indicating both that trade grew in regions which had so far been relatively backward, and 
that  investment in shipping increased in those regions.  The development of transport, 
whether coastal or overland, was important in other respects. It meant, for example, that 
more commercialised fertilisers were available, which in turn resulted in improvements in 
farming. It also facilitated the supply of raw materials to local industry and the marketing 
of its products. Indeed, both these trends seem to have occurred in one province on the 
Japan  Sea  side,  i.e.  Etchu  (present-day  Toyama  prefecture).  Growth  in  the  early 
nineteenth-century was rural-centred.   
  No doubt there must have been considerable regional differences in the pace of 
growth. Generally the western half of the country was wealthier than the eastern half. For 
example,  Choshu,  the  western-most  domain  of  Honshu  island,  was  probably  well 
advanced in both market growth and rural industrialisation at the turn of the eighteenth 
century. However, there is no evidence of increase in the per capita output of non-service 
products  between  the  1840s  and  1874.  The  share  of  the  non-agricultural  sector, 8 
 
furthermore,  remained  unchanged  over  the  same  period  (Nishikawa  1987:  335-6).  If 
Choshu was representative of all the western provinces, then it is likely that while the 
west showed little growth, there occurred a substantial expansion of production in central 
and eastern regions of the country, thus narrowing the gap between the regions. Indeed, 
all the evidence put forward by Umemura is consistent with this regional picture.   
  This  contrast  between  the  regions  merits  special  attention,  for  it  was  in  the 
central and eastern regions that silk goods, Japan’s major export category, had long been 
produced. Growth potential, however low the initial level of per capita output had been, 
was being accumulated there. Indeed, Umemura quotes figures showing an impressive 
improvement in breeding techniques of silkworms in an area of the north-eastern region 
(Umemura 1981: 27-9). In another silk-producing district, Suwa, too an upturn in output 
was unmistakable in the 1820s and this would eventually secure for this central Japan 
district the undisputed supremacy in the silk trade of the Meiji period. 
  Economic growth in the restoration period was export-led, but it represented 
neither an abrupt change, nor a passive response to an external event. The country’s entry 
into world trade stimulated the areas where growth was about to take place or had already 
been taking place. It is true that the commencement of foreign trade had a disruptive 
effect on cotton-producing areas, which were found mostly in the western half of the 
country.  Japanese  cotton  and  cotton  yarn  could  not  compete  in  the  world  market. 
Domestic  producers  were  hit  hard  when  British-made  cotton  goods  flowed  into  the 
country.  As  a  consequence,  cotton  spinning,  once  a  rural  handicraft  trade,  had  to  be 
re-established as a factory industry in the 1880s. Cotton weaving, on the other hand, was 
able to survive the competition, mostly by switching from hand-spun yarn to imported, 
and later domestic, factory-made yarn. On balance, therefore, it is safe to conclude that 
Japan’s rural economy gained from the entry into world trade although how large such a 
gain  might  have  been  is  still  debatable  (see  Huber  1971;  Crawcour  1989:  603-5). 
Export-led growth in the restoration period was rural-centred, and in this we see much 
continuity from the Tokugawa period. 
 
4. The Meiji reforms 
 
In practical terms, the Meiji Restoration meant the establishment of central government 
with the emperor ‘restored’ as effective sovereign. However, all the political, diplomatic 
and  financial  forces  that  led  to  the  collapse  of  Tokugawa  rule  necessitated  the 
commencement  of  a  series  of  institutional  as  well  as  constitutional  reforms.  Reform 
programmes  were  carried  out  along  the  lines  of  centralisation  and  Westernisation. 
Centralisation  was  thought  necessary  because  the  old  shogunate-domain  structure  no 
longer enabled Japan to survive in a world of competitive, sometimes confrontational 9 
 
relations. In order to survive, it was generally agreed, the country had to become a ‘rich 
nation’ with a ‘strong army’. For most of the new Meiji leaders, it was the West that 
provided  models  for  the  newborn  nation.  Inevitably,  ‘civilisation  and  enlightenment’ 
(bunmei kaika) became another slogan. 
  Thus, in 1871 the approximately 300 domains were replaced with a relatively 
small number of prefectures and the former daimyos’ rights to rule were taken away. With 
the abolition of the domains, the common people received the freedom to move and were, 
as the Charter Oath of 1868 promised, ‘permitted to pursue their respective callings’. The 
Tokugawa three-moneies system was united.
2  In 1869 silver was abandoned altogether as 
the unit of account, and the ryō (renamed yen in 1871) became the standard of value. As 
regards taxation, the land tax reform of 1873 was a significant achievement. The rice tax 
was replaced with a fixed tax payable in money. To this end a countrywide survey was 
carried out to establish the ownership and value of every piece of land. The government 
removed  the  ban  on  the  sale,  purchase  and  mortgage  of  land  and  issued  title  deeds 
recognising private ownership of the land surveyed. With this reform, therefore, modern 
property  rights  were  established  while  the  government  was  provided  with  a  unified, 
centralised tax system. 
  Keen interest in the West can be traced back to the Tokugawa period, but a 
significant move was taken by the new government when, in 1871, a delegation led by 
Prince Iwakura was sent to the United States and Europe. Conceived originally  as an 
attempt to revise the ‘unequal treaties’ with the West, Iwakura and his vice-ambassadors’ 
visit  to  the  West  turned  out,  in  retrospect,  to be  one  of  the  most  significant  learning 
missions  that  modern  Japan  undertook.  Its  one-and-a-half-year  tour  exposed  the  able 
leaders in the government to the wealth of Western civilised nations. They were dazzled 
by  the  affluence  that  the  people  of  the  West  enjoyed.  Some  of  them  already  had 
knowledge of how advanced Western science and technology were, but regardless of their 
degree  of  familiarity,  all  were  stunned  to  realise  in  how  many  aspects  Japan  lagged 
behind the Western countries. The British representative in Japan, Sir Harry Parkes, who 
accompanied the mission on its tour of Lancashire, Britain’s industrial heartland, told the 
visitors that ‘as far as Japan’s future traffic with the world and the promotion of new 
enterprise is concerned, this is the single most significant tour of inspection you are likely 
to have’ (quoted in Nish 1998: 44). Iwakura and the other  ambassadors realised how 
significant the visit was. Moreover, they understood how technology, industrialism and 
prosperity had been interrelated in Britain’s progress since the industrial revolution at the 
                                                 
2  Under Tokugawa rule, three moneies were used. Eastern Japan was gold-using while 
silver currency was the standard of value in the western half. Copper cash, on the other 
hand, was circulated as petty coinage in both regions. For a concise account of the 
monetary system, see Crowcour and Yamamura (1970): 490-3. 10 
 
turn of the century.   
  As a result of this and other learning experiences, virtually all the reform efforts 
the new government made were along Western lines.  The package imported from the 
West included not only tangible things such as Western-style weaponry, brick-built banks 
and  factories,  steam  ships  and  locomotives,  but  also  legal,  political,  economic  and 
educational  systems  and  institutions.  On  the  economic  side,  therefore,  this  package 
included all the important ingredients of industrialisation, i.e. its economic institutions 
such as banking, insurance, the joint-stock company and communications systems, on the 
one hand, and its productive base, ‘iron and coal’, on the other.   
 
5. Carry-overs from the Tokugawa past 
 
In order to carry out reforms and programmes to Westernise and industrilise the country, 
however, the new Meiji government faced a number of difficulties.  In the process of 
dealing with the difficulties, however, it may well be that the ways in which government 
leaders recognised problems, analysed situations and proposed plans were not particularly 
new. Age-old patterns of thinking and response are likely to have been revealed in the 
policy-making and institution-building processes. We may single out two problem areas 
in which the Meiji government encountered particular difficulties in the early Meiji years. 
Leaving aside the question of establishing a stable fiscal basis,  the new government’s 
economic  strategy  ultimately  hinged  on  the  control  of  the  money  supply  and  the 
determination of industrial policy. And it was in these two areas that we see carry-overs 
from the past. 
  The money supply under the Tokugawa system had been controlled by both 
central  and  local  authorities.  Gold  and  silver  coins  were  under  direct  control  of  the 
shogunate, while each daimyo’s domainal government was allowed to issue its own notes 
for circulation  within the domain.  At the end of the Tokugawa period the  number of 
domainal governments issuing paper money grew. Not all of them were successful, but it 
should be stressed that many domainal governments were able to sustain their note prices 
at reasonable levels, and that some of the governments which had experienced monetary 
crises  did  recover  and  rehabilitate  their  money  supplies.  Know-how  concerning  how 
concerning  the  management  of  a  ‘paper-money  economy’  was  indeed  one  of  the 
important legacies of the Tokugawa period. 
  Paper  money  was  issued  by  the  new  Meiji  central  government  too.  In  this 
regard, it is useful to consider a pamphlet on currency that Fukuzawa Yukichi, a Meiji 
enlightenment  leader,  published  in  1878  (Fukuzawa  zenshū  1958-71:  IV,  537-66).  The 
pamphlet was written in support of the then finance minister Ōkuma Shigenobu’s policy 
stance on the supply of paper money. From 1877 on, the amount of money increased 11 
 
rapidly, because of the large issue of notes by national banks made possible by the 1876 
revisions  of  the  National  Bank  Regulations  by  Ōkuma,  and  also  because  of  the 
government’s own issue of notes to meet the huge expenditures involved in suppression 
of a samurai rebellion in 1877. Fukuzawa  argued that printing money  was not  a bad 
policy per se. It could be justified if, and only if, the government exercised tight control 
of the amount of notes issued in relation to the demand for money by the population. He 
asked: ‘How is it that today’s economists forget about the situation in the old han [daimyo 
domain]  when  the  domainal  notes  were  in  circulation?’  In  the  domain  where  he  was 
brought up, Nakatsu in Kyushu, said Fukuzawa, neither gold nor silver coins were in 
circulation;  only  inconvertible  paper  money  was  used.  He  set  out  figures  for  the 
population and the amount of paper money in circulation in Nakatsu in the 1850s, then 
compared by adjusting price changes the per capita stock of paper money in 1877 with 
the figure for the 1850s. His conclusion was that the current money supply was not yet 
too excessive. 
  Whether Fukuzawa’s judgement on the situation in 1877 was correct or not does 
not concern us. The fact is that the disparity between silver currency and the paper notes 
issued by the government and national banks was widening during the 1870s, causing a 
substantial increase in prices just after Fukuzawa’s pamphlet was published, such that 
prices in 1881 were 200 per cent higher than the 1877-78 level (see Figure 3 below). 
What is significant in his remark is the information he provides us concerning the former 
domains’ experience in stabilising a paper-money economy. His story about the Nakatsu 
domain suggests that printing money was not taken as a desperate measure to make up for 
domain debts. Had he used assessed farm output instead of population, he might have 
been able to provide a better measurement. In fact, for the sample of domains for which 
data are available, there appears to be a close correlation between the domain’s putative 
farm output and notes in circulation (Nishikawa 1982). Calculations of this kind suggest 
that by the end of the Tokugawa regime officials of many domains had acquired skills in 
the management of paper money.   
  The printing of paper money in the early Meiji period, on the other hand, has 
not  been  regarded  as  a  success  story.  The  orthodox  interpretation  was  that  the 
decentralised system of national banks ended up in a state of chaos; it was Masayoshi 
Matsukata who was able, as finance minister from 1881 on, to return the banking system 
to normal and lay a foundation for a modern monetary system by setting up a central bank. 
It is true that in 1880 Ōkuma, whom Matsukata replaced, admitted that the money supply 
had overshot the target, and that he himself had started working out a plan to redeem bank 
notes. However, the above account of Matsukata’s achievement is significant for just the 
issue of who did it first. It implies that the banking system and hence the whole monetary 
policy  of  the  government  before  Matsukata  were  ineffective,  and  especially  that  the 12 
 
national banking system was an unsuccessful experiment. 
  The  national  banks,  authorised  by  the  1872  regulations,  were  the  first 
Western-style banking institutions. Having faced the chaotic financial situation caused by 
the opening of the Treaty ports and the collapse of the old domainal system, the new 
Meiji government sent Hirobumi Ito to the United States, who brought back a model of 
national banking with him. This decentralised American system had been implemented to 
supersede the even more decentralised ‘state banks’ in the United States but was still in 
sharp contrast to the central banking system. Although government ministers knew that it 
was  the  centralised  system  that  had  been  adopted  by  European  countries,  a  proposal 
which  favoured  it  was  rejected  by  a  majority  of  the  ministers.  In  1879  important 
amendments were made by Ōkuma to the Regulations, increasing the number of national 
banks set up in the various localities until it exceeded the government-set limit of 150. 
  Why, then, was this peculiar system favoured by the Meiji leaders? To answer 
this question, we have to know what Ōkuma, among others, thought were the chief causes 
of the financial chaos of the day. In one policy document, he mentioned the twin deficits, 
i.e.  the  deficits  on  foreign  trade  and  the  deficits  in  government  revenue,  as  the  most 
serious difficulties that the government faced. The underlying causes for such difficulties, 
said Ōkuma, were inadequate transport systems and the tightness in financial markets. 
The  latter  was  a  consequence  of  many  factors.  The  abolition  of  silver  as  the  unit  of 
account  caused a good deal of confusion among financiers,  especially  those based in 
Osaka. It is said that about 40 financial houses went bankrupt, including some leading 
Osaka money exchangers. The land tax reform also had a negative effect on the money 
markets. In Tokugawa times, it was the domainal administrations that collected rice as 
taxes and sent it to the Osaka market. Now that taxes were to be paid in cash, cultivators 
had to sell rice locally while the way in which the remittance from the countryside to the 
state treasury was to be carried out had to be newly established. Thus, the shortage of 
money was serious in local economies. Ōkuma noted in a 1875 policy document that the 
300 or so domainal governments of the past had themselves effectively been ‘running 
banking and other businesses for the people’; hence, he argued, their abolition by the new 
government meant the disappearance of such functions, which were indispensable for the 
local  economy  (Ōkuma  monjo  1958-63:  III,  127).  Just  like  Nakatsu  domain,  Ōkuma’s 
home domain, Saga, had also issued notes successfully, while Fukuzawa noted in the 
pamphlet that ‘we had a bank in each castle town in the days of the daimyo’. Clearly 
Ōkuma  and  Fukuzawa  had  much  in  common  with  respect  to  their  views  of  the  old 
domains’ performance in monetary policy. In view of Nishikawa’s finding that domainal 
note circulation was closely correlated with their population and agricultural output, it is 
no surprise that when determining the prefectural quota of the national banknote issues, 
Ōkuma based his calculations on each prefecture’s population and the amount of taxes 13 
 
collected. In other words, he hoped that local banks, established under the National Bank 
Regulations, would function just as the local domainal governments had done with their 
supply of paper money. In other world, favouring a decentralised system of banking, he 
was favouring the old system in modern guise. 
  Ōkuma’s  stance  on  monetary  policy  was  closely  related  to  his  approach  to 
development policy. One of the salient features of policy-making from 1873 is that he 
placed his hopes on local industry and commerce, as well as on big businesses such as 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi, to attain the government’s policy objectives. He had every reason 
to do so. First, as we have already seen, it was rural industries, such as the export-oriented 
silk  industry,  that  were  actually  growing  in  that  period.  Second,  the  government  was 
becoming  increasingly  worried  about  the  adverse  balance  of  foreign  trade.  Although 
exports were still increasing, imports were rising even more rapidly. Imports of consumer 
goods such as cotton cloth, sugar and kerosene increased. Thus the government wanted to 
see local industries expand, not only because they produced exportable goods, but also 
because imports might be replaced by products of the domestic rural sector.   
  If this was to be so, then how did Ōkubo and Ōkuma propose to promote rural 
industrial growth? One means  was to build model factories equipped with brand-new 
Western technologies. The silk-reeling factories at Maebashi and Tomioka and the cotton 
mills in Aichi and Hiroshima are such examples, but from this measure alone immediate 
results could not be expected. 
  It is in this respect that Ōkuma’s monetary policy had unmistakable relevance. 
His plan of supplying money through the national bank network to local economies was 
indeed intended to be a means to support the government’s industrial policy. And this idea 
too can be traced back to the late Tokugawa period. As already hinted earlier, from about 
1830 onwards many daimyos prompted domainal reforms. Well-known are those of the 
1840s in the four south-western domains that later led the anti-shogunate campaign, but 
the number of such reforms increased sharply in the decade prior to the opening of the 
treaty ports. This fact is significant, for many of the leaders of the reforms proposed ideas 
and measures quite similar to those of the Meiji policy-makers. In other words, fukoku 
(‘rich  country’)  became  the  domains’  goal  and  for  the  achievement  of  that  goal,  the 
‘encouragement  of  industry  and  trade’  was  thought  necessary.  Various  domainal 
governments thus encouraged the production of cash crops and manufactured goods by 
monopolising and ‘exporting’ them to Osaka and other commercial centres. In so doing 
the domains often issued paper money which, it was hoped, would serve as the supply of 
capital to the producers of their ‘export’ goods. Ōkuma’s Saga too combined note-issuing 
with development programmes. Better known perhaps, is the case of Fukui domain. In 
1858, Mitsuoka Hachiro (renamed later Yuri Kimimasa), under the influence of Yokoi 
Shonan, an intellectual of the ‘realist’ school, took the initiative to issue notes to buy up 14 
 
raw silk and other products in the domain, which were then sent to Nagasaki. Yuri called 
the  notes  kōsan  shihei  (paper  money  for  industry  promotion),  and  the  domainal 
government profited by as much as 50,000 ryō from this operation (Mitsuoka 1926: pt 2, 
ch.5). Although details are not known, leading village men and wealthy merchants from 
the castle town were involved in the scheme. It seems that the supply of paper money 
through the town merchant-financiers to the silk-producing villages had an ‘open sesame’ 
effect. This success in Fukui helped Yuri to gain charge of finance in the new-born Meiji 
government in 1868. His policy of issuing some 50 million ryō in government notes was 
a failure, however, and he was replaced by Ōkuma in 1870. However, as we have seen, 
Ōkuma’s idea of supplying money through the national banks for local industry was not 
very different from Yuri’s notion of ‘paper money for industry promotion’.   
 
6. Early Meiji Japan: a developmental state? 
 
As early as 1962 Alexander Gerschenkron argued that the sense of backwardness acted as 
an important factor in the European-wide diffusion of industrialisation. The awareness of 
backwardness  made  catching-up  the  goal  of  latecomer  countries.  Thus,  successful 
development by the latecomers such as Germany and Russia took a form very different 
from that of Britain, the first industrial nation. The state, among other actors, could play a 
crucial  role  in  economic  development  by  importing  advanced  technology  from  the 
advanced  countries,  building  institutions  suitable  for  development,  and  undertaking 
‘hands-on’ measures to strengthen the modern industrial base (Gerschenkron 1962). In 
Asia too, post-war ‘developmental states’ such as Thailand and South Korea are often 
referred to as cases in point, while Meiji Japan is considered its historical example.   
  However, ‘hands-on’ measures the latecomers took varied widely from case to 
case. Soviet Russia’s command economy is one extreme, while industrial policy pursued 
by  post-war  developmental  states  is  another.  Chalmers  Johnson  argues  that  post-war 
Japan and her industrial policy administered by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) offer archetypical illustrations for the developmental, ‘plan-rational’ state. 
He  stresses  that  plan  rationality  should  be  contrasted  with  market  rationality,  which 
characterises  the  Anglo-American  mode  of  state  orientation,  but  also  with  the 
plan-ideological  command  economy  of  the  Soviet  type.  Under  the  developmental, 
plan-rational regime, most of the ideas for economic development come from the state; 
privately owned businesses listen to the signals the government gives, i.e. subsides and 
licenses, and also words of mouth given through administrative guidance by bureaucrats. 
Economic  planning  is  thus  made  possible  through  these  government-business 
relationships (Johnson 1982).   
  As for its historical origins, there is some ambiguity in Johnson’s remarks. It is 15 
 
noted that this regime started in the 1930s, implying that during the period between 1900 
and 1930 ‘an approximation of laissez faire was in vogue’ (Johnson 1982: 33). In other 
words, much of pre-World War II Japan was market rational, rather than plan rational, 
which  is  now  substantiated  by  recent  studies  (Okazaki  and  Okuno-Fujiwara  1999; 
Teranishi 2005). On the other hand, he does say that ‘modern Japan began in 1868 to be 
plan rational and developmental’, and that even after about a decade of experimentation 
with state entrepreneurship, when it shifted to collaboration with the private sector, ‘Japan 
was  and  remained  plan  rational’  (Johnson  1982:  23).  It  is,  therefore,  interesting  to 
examine to what extent the early Meiji state was plan rational and developmental, and 
whether or not it remained so after the first decade of the Meiji era. 
  This issue will be explored by examining the words and deeds of a key leader of 
the early Meiji regime, i.e. Ōkubo Toshimichi, who led the country from 1873, when he 
returned from the Iwakura mission’s tour of the United States and Europe, until he was 
assassinated in 1878. We have already seen in the previous section how, under the Ōkubo 
administration, Ōkuma tried to take control of the economy in the 1870s. Yet since it was 
Ōkubo who laid down the framework for policy-making during the crucial period of early 
Meiji, it is worth placing his thoughts in a broader context.   
  The visit to the West as a member of the Iwakura mission opened the eyes of the 
man who had already established himself in the inner circle of the Meiji oligarchy. In a 
letter  he  wrote  from  England  (to  Ōyama  Iwao,  20/11/1872:  Ōkubo  monjo  1927-29:  IV, 
467-70), Ōkubo remarked that Britain was fifty years ahead of Japan, implying not that 
the gap was vast, but that the West was within reaching distance. Kume Kunitake, the 
mission’s official chronicler, shared this view: ‘It is since 1800 that Europe has attained 
its present wealth;  and it is only in the last forty years that it  has  achieved the truly 
remarkable level of prosperity we now see’ (Kume 2002: 57). Undoubtedly there was a 
sense of economic backwardness among the Meiji leaders, but they believed that the 
frontrunners were not unreachable. 
  In  another  letter  home  (to  Saigo  Takamori  and  Yoshii  Tomozane,  15/11/1872: 
Ōkubo monjo 1927-29: IV, 447-51), Ōkubo mentioned as extremely impressive the mills, 
shipyards and factories he saw on the tour of Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Newcastle, 
Bradford, Sheffield and Birmingham. Also mentioned in the same letter is the excellence 
of Britain’s transport network with its roads, bridge, railways and canals linking even 
remote places to the commercial centres. He realised that iron and coal had transformed 
Britain. It is not unlikely that he believed that, if borrowed from the West, ‘iron and coal’ 
technology would also transform Japan into a ‘rich nation’. Interestingly, a very similar 
view was expressed by Fukuzawa in Minjō isshin, a sequel to his own book on the history 
of civilisation. He listed as four innovations that had changed history, steam locomotion, 
electric telegraph, the postal system and printing, and concluded that because mails were 16 
 
delivered by steamships and the telegraph system and printing operated by means of the 
steam  engine,  ‘the  underlying  driving  force  of  human  society  lies  in  steam  power’ 
(Fukuzawa zenshū 1958-71: V, 6-7). It should be noted that Fukuzawa, a leading proponent 
of enlightenment, emphasised the role of the advance of such technology in ‘civilizing’ 
the  nation  by  raising  the  general  level  of  public  opinion,  whereas  Ōkubo,  being  an 
authoritarian statesman who had also been impressed by the Iron Chancellor Bismarck’s 
remarks during the mission’s visit to Germany, confined his attention to its effects on 
material progress. Despite these differences in approach, however, the observations of 
both  Ōkubo  and  Fukuzawa  imply  that  economic  development  has  to  be  achieved  by 
means of catching-up by borrowed technology. 
  Let us now turn to what Ōkubo actually did after his return from Europe. First, 
during the year 1873 there emerged a disagreement within the government over policy 
towards Korea, which broadened into an assessment of the national aim,  ‘rich nation, 
strong army’, as a whole. Ōkubo decidedly and successfully objected to an expansionist 
plan for a military expedition to Korea. In his famous memorial against the war proposal, 
he stated:   
‘Our government has started to stimulate industries, but it will be several years before 
we obtain results. … If we now begin an unnecessary war, spend a huge amount of 
money, shed blood, and worsen the daily life of people, all these government works 
will break like a bubble and lose several decades of time’ (Ōkubo monjo 1927-29: V, 
53-64, quoted from the translation in Lu 1997: 325). 
As Junji Banno notes, by saying that the proposed war was ‘unnecessary’ and by placing 
an  unmistakable  priority  on  ‘stimulating  industries’,  he  effectively  showed  that  ‘rich 
nation’ and ‘strong army’ were separable as policy objectives (Banno 1989).
3  Under his 
rule, therefore, economic development was the nation’s goal. Interestingly, this stance 
was  endorsed  eight  years  later  by  the  liberal  leader  Fukuzawa  in  another  influential 
pamphlet on ‘current affairs’ (Jiji shōgen) in 1880-81, at the time when the development 
policy was about to suffer a set-back (Fukuzawa zenshu 1958-71: V, 95-231). 
  Second, with the pro-warfare campaign quashed, Ōkubo spelt out an outline of 
the government’s industrial and trade policy. He declared in an 1874 document that: 
‘the strength or weakness of a country is dependent on the wealth or poverty of its 
people,  and  the  people’s  wealth  or  poverty  derives  from  the  volume  of  available 
products. The industriousness of the people is a major factor in determining the volume 
                                                 
3  After the opening of the country, there had merged two goals shared by influential 
samurai leaders, the political objective of kōgi yoron (government by public deliberation) 
and the economic and military objective of fukoku kyōhei. In this period the former 
objective too was split into two separate goals: the introduction of a party cabinet 
government and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy (Banno and Ohno 2010). 17 
 
of products available, but in the final analysis, it must be traced to the guidance and 
encouragement given by the government and its officials. … We have come to a point 
where all the internal conflicts have ceased, and the people can now enjoy peace and 
can securely engage in their respective callings. This is the most opportune time for the 
government  and  its  officials  to  adopt  a  protective  policy  which  has  as  its  goal  the 
enhancement of people’s livelihood’ (Ōkubo monjo 1927-29: V, 561-6, quoted from the 
translation in Lu 1997: 320 with alterations). 
Clearly he saw both ‘guidance’ and ‘encouragement’ by the government as the keys to the 
successful development of a latecomer nation like Meiji Japan. In this document, however, 
he stopped short of making specific proposals along these lines. 
  Third,  therefore,  we  have  to  look  at  the  actual  industrial  and  trade  policies 
adopted by the Ōkubo administration. Despite the publicly declared emphasis on state 
guidance and protective measures to stimulate the economy, it was the adverse balance of 
foreign trade, as well as the inability to raise revenues through indirect taxation channels, 
that  dictated  the  government’s  policy-making.  Inevitably  ‘increasing  exports  and 
restraining  imports’  became  urgent  policy  objectives.  Since  1870,  the  Department  of 
Industry had been responsible for the promotion of industry. Through this department, a 
substantial  amount  of  money  was  sunk  in  large-scale  projects.  About  a  half  of  the 
department’s total investments went to the construction of railways and a third to mining. 
The former was in line with Ōkubo’s emphasis on transport infrastructure while the latter, 
especially  investments  in  coal  mines,  were  not  inconsistent  with  the  government’s 
concern with the balance of payments because coal was an export good of the day.   
  However,  Ōkubo  did  not  want  to  take  such  a  narrowly  based  approach  to 
development.  Thus, the Department of  Industry’s  expenditure on railway construction 
was drastically cut back from 1875 onwards. The newly established Home Ministry, of 
which  Ōkubo  himself  held  the  portfolio,  was  given  charge  of  broader  areas  in 
development policy, ranging from the merchant marine to agriculture and handicrafts. A 
look at the May 1875 ordinance establishing the ministry makes it clear that Ōkubo’s 
hopes rested heavily on the development of local industries as export producers as well as 
on  that  of  big  businesses  in  shipping  (Ōkubo  monjo  1927-9:  IV,  363-6).  The  Home 
Ministry too possessed state-run enterprises, but they were model factories and smaller in 
scale.  Of  these,  sugar  refineries,  spinning  mills,  and  cotton  and  woollen  fabric 
manufactories were set up in the hope that domestic products would eventually replace 
imports, but such projects turned out to be unsuccessful (and with Department of Industry 
enterprises were later sold to private interests in 1880). More important was the policy of 
fostering the merchant marine as an infant industry. In his memorandum on the shipping 
trade, Ōkubo laid down three options that the government could take: first, to leave the 
industry in private hands, second, to protect and foster private enterprises, and third, to 18 
 
place  the  trade  under  complete  government  management.  However,  he  proposed  to 
choose  the  second,  implying  in  this  case  government  aid  to  a  single  private  firm, 
Mitsubishi (Ōkubo monjo 1927-29: VI, 352-60).
4  A similar but less monopolistic approach 
was adopted in other areas. No ‘hands-on’ measures were taken. Instead subsidies were 
given to one-off projects on an ad hoc basis, most of which went to those proposed by 
prefectural governors. A well-known example of such a governor is Mishima Michitsune 
of  both  Fukushima  and  Yamagata,  who  displayed  a  controversial  ability  for  pushing 
through road-construction projects. About a third of the total capital sunk in all road and 
bridge  projects  in  Yamagata  came  from  central  government  sources  (Umemura  and 
Yamamoto  1989:  32-7).  Another  case  in  point  is  Fujimura  Shiro  of  Yamanashi,  a 
proto-industrial prefecture. Like Mishima, he was nicknamed a road-building governor, 
but  during  his  long  period  of  governorship  beginning  in  1873,  he  also  showed  an 
unusually keen interest in the promotion of local industry. By 1880 he had successfully 
channelled funds from the central government to a silk filature and a winery, and to two 
privately operated firms. In the case of the prefectural projects, well over 50 per cent of 
the costs were covered by money from the Home Ministry and other government sources 
(Saito 1983: 272-9). However, the vast majority of local producers in the country were 
unable  to  receive  such  ad  hoc  governmental  subsidies.  It  was,  therefore,  Ōkuma’s 
monetary policy that proved effective in helping such local entrepreneurs. Given the fact 
that  Japan’s  virtually  all  export  goods  were  products  of  the  countryside,  it  was  the 
promotion of exports, rather than import-substitution, that made sense in the early Meiji 
early Meiji situation. 
  The Meiji government was born in an age when a strong state initiative was 
expected if a country was to compete with the Western superpowers. However, what the 
early Meiji  government actually did suggests that it  was not  plan rational. Under the 
clauses  of  the  ‘unequal  treaties’,  Japan  was  in  no  position  to  adopt  protective  trade 
policies. Given persistent trade deficits and the government’s difficulties to broaden its 
tax base, a hasty transplanting of any industrial package from the West was unrealistic. 
Without  any  modern  notion  of  macro-economics  such  as  national  accounting  and 
input-output analysis, no proper ‘planning’ was possible. The Meiji leaders never dropped 
the  idea  that  the  nation  ought  to  be  guided  by  the  state  to  achieve  the  proclaimed 
objectives  of  ‘rich  nation,  strong  army’.  After  the  brief  period  of  experiments  with 
                                                 
4  This does not imply that Mitsubishi’s monopoly was unchallenged. On the contrary, 
fierce competition broke out in the early 1880s, which led to further government 
intervention. Throughout the period until World War I, competition and, to a lesser extent, 
government subsidies played significant roles in the development of Japan’s merchant 
marine and in reducing freight rates in ocean transport. See Wray (1986) for a brief 
history of shipping in the early Meiji period, and Yasuba (1978) for estimates of 
productivity growth in the shipping trade. 19 
 
hands-on  policies,  however,  the  government  realised  that  both  hands-on  development 
policy and ‘strong army’ objectives ought to be shelved—for the time being, at least. As a 
consequence, more emphasis had to be placed on the development of traditional sectors 
of the economy during the Ōkubo-Ōkuma period, for which no Governmental guidance 
was possible. The provision of paper money was virtually the only policy measure the 
government could take in order to stimulate the economy. In this respect, the development 
policy  of  early  Meiji  Japan  was  still  conceived  within  the  Tokugawa  conceptual 
framework. 
 
7. 1885: looking ahead 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the nation’s economy expanded while prices recorded a substantial 
increase during the Ōkubo-Ōkuma period. In real terms, the economy managed to grow 
by 8 per cent from 1875 to 1880. In October 1881, Ōkuma was sacked and Matsukata 
took over the  government’s financial portfolio. Both gross national product  at market 
prices and the wholesale price index peaked in 1881, which has been taken to imply that 
Matsukata’s austerity policy led the economy into recession. A careful analysis by Juro 
Teranishi  of  the  macro-economic  indicators  of  this  period  shows  that  both  personal 
consumption and inventory capital had started to contract during the year 1880, indicating 
that  the  economy  had  already  entered  a  downswing  phase  of  the  trade  cycle  before 
Ōkuma was replaced by Matsukata. He goes on to argue that Matsukata’s deflationary 
policy  simply  aggravated  the  recession  (Teranishi  1983).  Whichever  the  diagnosis, 
however, it is widely agreed that the Matsukata deflation period was a turning point in the 
economic history of Meiji Japan. The age of ‘paper money for industry promotion’ was 
over.  The  decentralised  national  banking  system  was  taken  over  by  a  new  financial 
regime  with  a  central  bank.  With  the  Bank  of  Japan  established  in  1882  and  the 
government-issued paper money and national bank notes brought to par, all note issue 
was centralised. Thus, in 1886 the country saw its economy entering a new phase. From 
that year on a number of new firms were set up in spinning and railways, most of which 
took  the  form  of  western-style  joint-stock  companies.  However,  such  growth  of  the 
modern sector was not at the expense of traditional industries. The traditional sector also 
grew. Export-oriented silk reeling continued to grow while cotton weaving and other rural 
industries found an expanding domestic market during the rest of the Meiji period. It was, 
therefore,  a  parallel  growth  of  the  modern  and  traditional  sectors.  Much  of  Meiji 
economic growth was still achieved within a pre-modern, rural setting (Nakamura 1983; 
Hashino and Saito 2004; Abe and Nishikawa in this volume). 
  After the Matsukata recession the economy returned back on the growth track, 
which had differential effects on the two major constraints that the new Meiji government 20 
 
had faced. While it failed to exert much influence on the balance of payments before 
World War I, the government’s tax revenue increased a great deal. Since the Restoration 
of 1868, the Meiji government tried to broaden its tax base. Following a period of trials 
and  errors  in  the  areas  of  miscellaneous  indirect  taxes  and  excises,  the  government 
succeeded in sorting out the mess with respect to the direct and indirect demarcations, as 
well as to the central and local governmental division of labour, by the turn of the century. 
As the land tax decreased its share gradually, indirect duties such as the tax on alcoholic 
beverages emerged as one of the major sources of public revenue together with the newly 
introduced income and corporate taxes (the former was introduced in 1887 and the latter 
in 1900), through which the state could now benefit from the nation’s economic growth. 
Also noteworthy is a structural change in politics brought about the promulgation of the 
Meiji Constitution in 1889, under which a parliamentary cabinet system was introduced. 
This made the formation and re-formation of political alliances, which had already been 
common  in  the  Restoration  period,  more  open,  paving  the  way  to  tax  rate  increases, 
which the government had long craved for, in exchange for public expenditure growth, 
which could now be spent on local projects to win the vote for the parties’ favour (Banno 
and Ohno 2010; Nakabayashi forthcoming). 
  With  the  government’s  capacity  to  increase  tax  revenue  enhanced,  the  once 
pigeonholed  national  objectives  of  ‘rich  nation’  and  ‘strong  army’  returned  as  policy 
agendas. In 1885, as expected from the accounts in the previous sections, the share of the 
government  in  national  income  was  low:  the  proportion  of  the  government’s  total 
expenditure to gross national expenditure (GNE) stood as low as 11 per cent, a level 
comparable to most of the Western countries in the pre-World War I period. The share 
increased to 15 per cent in 1913, then to 21 per cent in 1935.
5  This upward trend in the 
early twentieth century is found in most industrialised countries; however, it should be 
noted that while in Britain and other Western countries the growth in the   rate of 
government expenditure was accounted for by the expansion of welfare expenditures, the 
Japanese pattern does not fit  this explanation. Japan was one of the few nations who 
‘resisted’  the  long  rise  of  social  spending  (Lindert  2004:  15).
6  A close look at the 
                                                 
5  All the percentages are three-year averages centred on the year indicated, calculated 
from Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979): 251-3, 370-1. 
6  For a brief comparative account of public sector growth in the period in question, see 
also Middleton (2004): 467-8. His table for OECD countries (taken from Tanzi and 
Schuknecht 2000: 6-7, 52-3) shows different percentages for Japan. Tanzi and 
Schuknecht’s 1913 estimate is substantially smaller than my calculation derived from 
Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979), while their 1937 estimate is slightly larger than mine. The 
slight difference for 1935/37 can be accounted for by the fact that my calculation took 
three-year averages centred on 1935 while theirs is likely to have been for the single year 
of 1937. For 1913, on the other hand, the difference is so large that their definition and 
coverage must have differed as to government expenditure. Whatever the differences, 21 
 
macro-economic statistics of this period reveals,
7  first, that tax revenue increased by 70 
per cent  from 1880 to 1913 and nearly doubled from 1913 to 1935—in 1880 the per 
capita tax burden was 7 yen in 1934-6 prices; it increased to 21 yen in 1913, then to 40 
yen in 1935. Second, spending on social services barely kept pace with revenue growth 
before World War I (if social security expenditure is singled out, its growth rate was 
negative), while after the War its rate of increase exceeded that of revenue growth. Third, 
on  the  other  hand,  both  military  and  capital  expenditure  areas  (the  latter  excluding 
military investments) expanded at a speed far greater than the other areas throughout the 
entire period in question. Overall expenditure in the former two areas increased more than 
five times: in 1880 per-capita military expenditure was 0.9 yen and per-capita capital 
expenditure 0.8 yen; the figure increased to 7.6 yen and 6.7 yen respectively in 1913, then 
to 16 yen and 13 yen in 1935 (all in 1934-35 prices). It seems therefore that most of the 
finance  ministers  from  1885  on  gave  in  to  the  demands  from  both  the  military  and 
industrialisation camps.   
  A  few  comments  are  due  on  these  statistical  facts.  First,  actual  military 
expenditure grew more rapidly over the 50-year period than the above figures implied 
since  the  calculations  were  all  for  peace-time  budgets.  During  the  Sino-  and 
Russo-Japanese  Wars,  World  War  I  and  the  Manchurian  Incident,  the  proportion  of 
military  spending  to  GNE  jumped from  the  normal  level  of  2-3  per  cent:  in  1904-6, 
especially, it exceeded well over the 10 per cent mark (Ohkawa and Shinohara 1979: 
373-5). Such war-time budgets were supported largely by public debts. In 1897 Japan 
moved from the silver to the gold standard. This made the issuing of government bonds in 
London and other international capital markets easier, thus boosting the state’s ability to 
raise spending levels. With this, one may argue, the Japanese fiscal state came into being 
(Nakabayashi forthcoming).   
  On  the  industrial  side,  second,  much  of  the  government’s  spending  went  to 
infrastructure building. In Tokugawa times, the transport infrastructure was disgracefully 
poor.  The  new  Meiji  government  announced  that  the  state  would  take  primary 
responsibility  for  ‘public  utilities’,  and  its  investments  in  the  rail  and  road  networks 
followed. It is interesting to note that a similar view was expressed by Fukuzawa, one of 
the  few  who  genuinely  believed  in  the  laissez-faire  doctrine  (Minkan  keizairoku,  in 
Fukuzawa zenshū 1958-71: IV, 373-8). For him, as we have seen, the building of a railway 
                                                                                                                                       
however, the both estimates exhibit an unmistakably upward trend over the period from 
the pre-World War I to the 1930s. 
7  The following account is derived from statistics in Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979): 
370-8, 387-8, 392-3, and in Emi and Shionoya (1966): 202-5. The GNE deflator is 
extrapolated to 1880 by using a composite index of consumers’ and investment goods 
price series. The calculations are based on three-year averages centred on the year 
indicated. 22 
 
network was one of the driving forces of history. It should not be left undone, he argued. 
On the face of it, the railway ‘does not directly relate to public affairs’; but at the same 
time, since it would be difficult for early-Meiji private companies to run Western-style 
railways without loss, the state should take the lead in such an area. With this kind of 
broad consensus for the government’s role in railway- and road-building, the post-1885 
period saw other areas—such as harbours, waterworks and schools—also attracting the 
attention of both government and party politicians. In provincial districts in particular, the 
provision  of  public  works  increased  with  the  rise  of  political  parties,  especially  the 
Seiyūkai and its ‘pork barrel’ politics.   
  Third,  with  protectionist  measures  inadaptable,  the  early  Meiji  government 
opted for loans and subsidies to industries. This situation did not change until 1911 when 
the  revision  of  the  treaties  entered  into  full  effect.  Even  after  tariff  autonomy  was 
achieved, however, customs and import quotas were not major policy tools. It is true that 
tariffs  were  eventually  raised  in  order  to  protect  some  industries  with  strong 
import-substitution  potentials.  But  the  government’s  industrial  policy  during  the  late 
Meiji period remained concentrated on the granting of subsidies to industries, as in the 
case of shipping and shipbuilding under the Navigation Subsidy Act and the Shipbuilding 
Encouragement Act (both of 1896) and of agriculture in the inter-war period. Another 
policy measure was the allocation of funds to promote specific aims through ‘special’ 
banks such as the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank of Japan, as well as 
through various trade associations in local industrial districts. Both involved a relatively 
small amount of government money. Indeed, the successive governments after 1885 were 
not particularly generous fiscally, so that the proportion of industrial subsidies to the total 
government expenditures remained generally low in the period before 1940, compared 
with levels in the post-war period (Ohkawa and Shinohara 1979: 370-2).   
  All this may be interpreted as supporting evidence for the view that much of the 
pre-war  economic  regime  is  characterised  by  market  rationality,  rather  than  plan 
rationality, and the post-World War II MITI and its plan-rational industrial policy are 
‘genuine children of the Showa era [i.e. the period after the late 1930s]’ (Johnson 1982: 
33). It is certainly true that Meiji Japan was never a developmental, plan-rational state. 
However, it should be remembered that while a market-rational school gradually gained a 
political importance, industry promotion remained as one of the competing agendas; thus, 
even in the period after 1885, the battle line was still between the warfare (kyōhei) and 
industry promotion (fukoku) groups, not between the pro-market and industry promotion 
camps. What the foregoing statistics suggest, therefore, is simply that the treasury of the 
post-1885 period was generally more responsive to the demands of warfare than those of 
industry promotion, allowing the pro-market camp to enjoy a prolonged spell of relative 
ascendancy, but leaving no room for welfare spending growth. 23 
 




Sources: Shimbo (1978); 282; and Saito (1975): 772. 
Notes:  1) In the upper series, Meiji prices are linked with Tokugawa prices in gold 
currency  units  (with  1854-56  =  100),  while  the  lower  series  is 
silver-denominated (with 1874-76 = 100). Both are for Osaka. 
  2) Both series are five-year moving averages. 24 
 
Figure 2. Index of the relative price of export-related goods, 1842-77   
 
 
Sources: Shimbo (1978): 290. 
Note:    The index is the domestic price series for export-related goods relative to that for 
import-related goods (five-year moving averages with 1854-56 = 100).   25 
 
Figure 3. Yearly changes in GNP and the Tokyo price index, 1875-90 
 
A.  GNP in current prices 
 
B.  Tokyo wholesale price index 
 
 
Sources: GNP from Teranishi (1983): 181; and the price index from Arita and Nakamura 
(1992): 62-5. 
Notes  1.  GNP  figures  in  the  upper  panel  do  not  cover  investment  in  non-primary 
industrial construction and inventory, for which data are unavailable for earlier 
years. Estimates are in current prices.   
  2. The price index series in the lower panel is for wholesale prices in Tokyo, 
with 1899-1901 = 100. No attempt has been made to estimate a GNP deflator 
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